This paper presents a new framework for studying irreversible investment when a market follows random-length cycles (e.g., due to business cycles). Despite uncertainty continuously evolves over time, our model does not require stochastic calculus but conditional probabilities, which allows for a marginal interpretation of optimal (dis)investment rules, absent in the real options literature based on Geometric Brownian Motion. Despite the stochastic process of the underlying variable has a continuous sample path, our model predicts that a firm's value experiences jumps upwards (downwards) when the upturn (downturn) of a cycle starts, due to abrupt changes in the firm's information set.
Introduction
A recurrent feature of the U.S. business cycle is the periodic shift of the gross national product from a positive growth rate to a negative growth rate (Hamilton 1989) . A large number of industries are very sensitive to business cycle movements over time, and the temporal evolution of their demand or profit is highly dependent on the state of the economy. Examples of cyclical industries include very different sectors such as construction, household furniture, carpets and rugs, wholesale trade, legal or childcare services, hotels, motor vehicles and automobile repair, railroad transportation, metalworking machinery, etc. 1 The strong dependence of such industries on the evolution of the business cycle creates an important source of uncertainty, given the consensus that such cycles do not behave deterministically. 2 This paper builds on the claim that the modern theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty is not well suited for dealing with variables that critically affect investment behavior and evolve cyclically in a stochastic fashion. 3 For instance, there is no clear way to explicitly model cycles characterized by growth and decline phases by means of a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM). By not properly capturing the stochastic nature of business cycles, real options theory neglects its implications for both investment behavior and the value of investment opportunities in numerous industries such as the ones described.
It is our purpose to fill in this gap by constructing a stochastic process that represents random-length business cycles so as to analyze (dis)investment behavior in such settings. Figure 1 shows actual sample paths of a process such as that we aim at representing -at least in a stylized way-. 1 See Berman and Pfleeger (1997) . 2 For instance, Hamilton's (1989) seminal paper spawned an increasingly large literature devoted to the empirical estimation of time series that are assumed to experiment unobservable changes in its growth rate at some random dates. 3 Two classic papers on real options theory are McDonald and Siegel (1986) and Dixit (1989) . Pindyck (1991) or Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide excellent surveys of the most relevant theoretical developments. To model such random evolution, we introduce a regime-switching stochastic process in continuous time in which the change between a phase of growth and a phase of decline is governed by the outcome of a two-state Markov process. Given this setup, we provide closed-form solutions to the optimal entry and exit rules of a firm that has a monopoly right to invest (or disinvest) in a single discrete project of fixed size. In addition, the paper also studies the value of an investment opportunity, whose functional form turns out to be somewhat similar to that which obtains by using a classical GBM setting. Yet, the contribution of the paper is not limited to the theoretical framework we propose to better assess the value of investment opportunities in industries whose demand or profit evolve in a stochastically cyclical manner, which has already been examined by Drifill, Raybaudi and Sola (2003) . More importantly, our model predicts that the value of the option to (dis)invest (and, hence, the value of the firm) experiences discontinuous jumps at the switching dates, despite the evolution of the underlying variable is continuous. Intuitively, the jumps are caused by abrupt changes in the firm's information set, due to the sudden realization of a peak or a trough, so that the firm's value jumps upwards (downwards) if the upturn (downturn) of the cycle suddenly begins. In a broad sense, the results of our paper conform to the empirical evidence that stock market crashes (booms) precede recession (expansion) phases of the real economy, although the former do not cause the latter, but rather it is (expectations of) recessions or expansions that provokes the stock market to crash or boom, respectively. 4 Further, such empirical prediction is in stark contrast to that of conventional real options models, which do not predict jumps in the value of a firm, whether active or not, when the stochastic process of the underlying variable has a continuous sample path.
Indeed, real options theory predicts discontinuities in the sample path of the firm's value only if the underlying variable experiences a discontinuous jump at same dates (e.g., due
to Poisson arrivals). This significant difference with our model can be traced back to the idea proposed by Gutiérrez and Ruiz-Aliseda (2003) , according to which it is the derivative of the sample path that is discontinuous at some points, not the sample path itself. In this sense, we obtain a related result because we elaborate on their one-cycle setting and extend it to the infinite-cycle case, which prevents the firm's value from dropping down to zero as happens in their paper.
Furthermore, the novel framework we introduce has relevant conceptual implications, based on the resolution technique employed. More precisely, our model does not require using Ito calculus but conditional probabilities, 5 and can be solved using either dynamic programming or standard optimization based on ordinary calculus. Despite the first approach is much simpler and probably more adequate for most applications, the second one presents an important advantage from a theoretical standpoint: it allows for a marginal interpretation of optimal (dis)investment rules. Marginality conditions are probably one of the strongest conceptual roots of current economic thinking, but, so far, real options theory 4 Actually, our theoretical model predicts that a stock market crash (boom) occurs at the same time as an economic recession (expansion). However, from an observational point of view, the former would be perceived earlier than the latter because of the discontinuous change in the price of the stock as opposed to the continuous change of the GNP, say. 5 Using the terminology coined by Zeira (1987), our model is one of structural uncertainty, although uncertainty renews over time, unlike Zeira's (1987) single firm setting or Rob's (1991) competitive setup.
lacks of a marginal interpretation. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find the claim from both scholars and practitioners that such literature is largely technical and hardly intuitive. Our paper shows that a firm must wait to invest until the marginal cost of waiting (to invest) equals the marginal value of waiting. The marginal cost is the profit flow forgone for not investing, while the marginal value of delaying investment has two components. On the one hand, waiting allows a firm to save part of its investment cost. On the other, there is a marginal option value of waiting because a firm avoids making a wrong decision with certain probability. For instance, for the case of entry when the industry is expanding, a sudden start of the downturn of the market would imply an abrupt downward jump in the net present value (NPV) of the project if the firm had chosen to invest. As a result, delaying entry would allow a firm to avoid such abrupt fall in the NPV of an investment that would be sunk otherwise. Of course, the loss avoided by waiting should be weighed by the probability that the downturn occurs over that period of time. A somewhat similar reasoning holds for the optimal exit rule, taking into account that the start of the upturn of the cycle would imply an upward jump in the value of an active firm.
The neoclassical features of real options theory have already been discussed by Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 145) along the lines of the Jorgensonian user cost of capital. In this sense, a more precise marginal interpretation can be found in Abel and Eberly (1996) .
In particular, they identify the opportunity cost of waiting as well as the reduction in sunk cost to be paid, and notice that there is an additional effect to take into account when there is uncertainty: the expected value of the capital loss. However, such marginal interpretation is not related to the "bad news principle of irreversible investment" spelled out by Bernanke (1983) , which is precisely the conceptual pillar of real options theory. Our paper complements the Jorgensonian marginal approach and bridges this gap by identifying and quantifying the so-called "marginal option value of waiting."
There is a recent but growing literature in financial economics that pays attention to regime-switching models, as exemplified by Bansal and Zhou (2002) for instance. In the field of investment under uncertainty, our work is related to other real option papers that include a regime-shift setting maintaining the traditional GBM assumption. In particular, Driffill, Raybaudi and Sola (2003) or Guo, Miao and Morellec (2004) model the temporal evolution of demand by the means of a GBM together with a (discrete) switching of the drift and volatility parameters of such process at random dates. 6 The first of these two papers studies the problem of a firm that has to decide when to invest in one unit of capital (as well as when to divest it), while the second is the extension to the continuous investment case. In addition, our paper is inspired to a large extent by the one-cycle setup of Gutiérrez and Ruiz-Aliseda (2003), and constitutes a generalization of their analysis. In particular, they model a market that grows until some date, after which the market declines until it disappears. Uncertainty stems from the switching date, which is a random variable, and therefore the environment becomes deterministic once its realization is revealed. These authors analyze the investment behavior of a monopolistic firm and perform some comparative statics to show that greater uncertainty may speed up entry and may decrease the value of an investment opportunity.
While their model may be a stylized description of the stochastic nature of product life cycles followed by microprocessors or pharmaceutical goods, it does not apply to industries whose evolution depends on that of (random-length) business cycles, unlike the framework we introduce. An additional aspect that differentiates the current work from all these real options papers is that we solve the (much harder) problem of market exit.
The differences with the model of Driffill, Raybaudi and Sola (2003) and the extension by Guo, Miao and Morellec (2004) deserve more detailed comments, given that our setup can be interpreted as a special case of theirs, just by letting the variance parameters of the two diffusion processes they consider be zero. Notwithstanding, we believe that a GBM-based setting obscures some key aspects of regime-switching models that have rel-evant implications for the real options literature, and are not acknowledged by these two papers, at least explicitly. At a conceptual level, there are two aspects that our setup helps to unveil. On the one hand, dropping the GBM assumption allows us to employ a different method of resolution so that optimal entry/exit rules can be given a marginal interpretation based on the well-known "bad news principle of irreversible investment." On the other hand, the possibility that regime-shifts occur at random times generates a source of uncertainty that creates an option value of waiting to (dis)invest in its own right, which constitutes the basis for analysis in Gutiérrez and Ruiz-Aliseda (2003). As a result, our model emphasizes that waiting allows a firm to update its beliefs about the profitability of its investment opportunity in a Bayesian fashion, and analyzes how this logic materializes in an infinite-cycle setup. Finally, at a predictive level, an aspect that is intimately related to the underlying Bayesian updating process and is not noticed by these two papers is the discontinuous jumps in the value of an (in)active firm, which take place when an expansion or a recession suddenly starts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the stochastic process that constitutes the starting point of our analysis. Given the novelty of the process, Section 3 provides some mathematical results such as first-hitting times and present value calculations, which are necessary for subsequent sections, although the uninterested reader can skip them and still understand the results of the paper -except perhaps for the notation we introduce. Section 4 provides closed-form solutions to the entry and exit problems of a monopolist. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
In this section we construct a stochastic process with continuous sample paths that represents the random evolution of a certain variable Π. For the sake of concreteness, Π (t) denotes instantaneous profit at time t, although it could certainly represent any other vari-able such as demand or price of a product.
Let {α (t) , t ≥ 0} be a homogeneous Markov chain with states {α 1 , α 2 } ∈ R ++ × R −− and transition probability such that Pr (α (t + dt) = α 3−i |α (t) = α i ) ' λ i dt, for all t ≥ 0, i = 1, 2. For convenience, we let α (0) = α 1 . In particular, denoting the inter-arrival time of
is a sequence of exponential random variables such that the inter-arrival times with odd (even) subscripts are exponentially distributed with rate λ 1 > 0 (λ 2 > 0) . In principle, the rates λ 1 and λ 2 could be different. Hence, the stochastic process itself satisfies the Markov property. Assuming that the initial date is T 0 = 0, let us now define T i = T i−1 + τ i , for all i = 1, 2, ... We refer to each T i as a switching date.
The functional form of Π is governed by the Markov process defined above, which determines the instantaneous growth and decline rate of Π over time. Figure 2 shows two sample paths of the process we have described. As seen in the figure, Π (t) grows exponentially at rate α 1 > 0 during the random length period (T i−1 , T i ) (i = 1, 3, ...) , and decreases exponentially at rate α 2 < 0 during (T i−1 , T i ) (i = 2, 4, ...) . The sample path is assumed to be continuous because lim t↑T i Π (t) = lim t↓T i Π (t) , although the path will exhibit a kink at any switching date T i , i = 1, 2, ..., and it will be almost everywhere differentiable.
Finally, it follows that Π (t) > 0 for any t ≥ 0 and any set of realizations of
we assume that Π (0) > 0. Note also that there are two (complementary) ways of introducing a positive expected drift in the temporal evolution of Π (t) . Specifically, in the long run, the variable is expected to reach a future level higher than the current one if α 1 + α 2 > 0 and/or λ 1 < λ 2 . Finally, given the infinite horizon and the Markov property of the process, the current state of the system is clearly summarized just by the current level of the profit flow and its current instantaneous growth rate. Henceforth, though, the state will only refer to the level of the profit flow, and we will make explicit whether the process is growing or not for the sake of clarity.
Figure 2: Two sample paths of the stochastic process
The random process we have described may represent the evolution of the real economy as it expands and recedes in a stochastic fashion, with odd switching dates corresponding to peaks, and even switching dates correspondig to troughs, due to random-length business cycles, although there may be other interpretations. The assumption that the termination probability of a business expansion or contraction does not vary with age as in Hamilton (1989) is legitimate according to Diebold and Rudebusch (1990) , who find little evidence for duration dependence.
This paper is concerned with investment decisions given the random temporal evolution of a variable that determines the profitability of the investment opportunity. For the conceptual points we want to make, it suffices to consider a single decision-maker such as a firm with a monopoly over the investment opportunity (e.g., due to a patent), although strategic competition contexts are probably more relevant for applications of our setup. In particular, the paper studies a monopolist's decisions to enter and exit a market, each in isolation, 7 given that the flow of profits made by the firm if active in the market follows the stochastic process described above. Specifically, at each date, the firm does not know when the next peak or trough will happen, although it knows the current level of profit flow and whether the cycle is growing or decaying. If the firm enters the market, then it incurs a positive sunk cost K, and in return starts operating forever immediately (i.e., there is no time-to-build). The firm's decision will consist of choosing an optimal investment threshold to enter the market. The threshold must be constant because of the infinite horizon and the Markov property of the process, which makes the time elapsed since the last switching date irrelevant from a belief updating standpoint. Similarly, when exiting the market, the firm is assumed to recover some non-negative value S, which can be the salvage or redeployment value of the asset. As with the entry decision, the firm chooses an optimal exit threshold that is constant. Once the firm chooses to exit the market, it is not allowed to reenter the market. Finally, we assume that the firm is risk neutral and uses a discount rate r that is greater than α 1 in order to bound the expected stream of discounted profits made by the firm if in operation in the market.
Mathematical preliminaries
In this section, we derive some relevant mathematical results regarding the stochastic process defined in Section 2. All of them are necessary for Section 4 and are useful properties for working on the state space of the process, although they can be skipped without affecting the understanding of the main points of subsequent sections. Throughout, we denote the current level of the profit flow by π 0 . The first subsection deals with the conditional distribution of the instantaneous profit at the immediate switching date, while the second one deals with state space discount factors and discounted present values. 7 It is straightforward to study combined entry and exit as in Dixit (1989) .
Conditional distribution functions over the state space
Given that we are going to work on the state space, rather than the time space, it is necessary to identify the relevant probability distributions. This is the purpose of the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Conditional on the profit flow π 0 increasing, the probability that the next switching date occurs before reaching state π is
Conditional on the profit flow π 0 decreasing, the probability that the next switching date occurs before reaching state π is
Proof. See Appendix A.
Discounted present values and expected discount factors
, it is possible to compute the expected stream of discounted profits if the firm is active in the market forever given the current state π:
Theorem 1 If the firm is operating at π, then the expected stream of discounted profits is E 1 (π) = ρ 1 π if the profit flow is growing, and E 2 (π) = ρ 2 π if the profit flow is declining.
→ 0, then process stays at π forever almost surely,
The expected stream of discounted profits derived above is based on the assumption that the firm will operate indefinitely. Sometimes, as when the firm foresees exiting at some random time in the future, it is also necessary to use a couple of formulas for transitional payoffs: the expected discount factor E ¡ e −rT ¢ and the expected stream of discounted profits E R T 0 Π (t) e −rt dt, where T is the first passage time from the initial state π to state π * , and the expectation operator is conditional upon the current level π.
Theorem 2 (i)If the profit flow is increasing at π, the expected discount factor when the process first comes back to π from above is
, while if the profit flow is decreasing at π, the expected discount factor when the process first comes back to π from below is
(ii)If the profit flow is increasing at π, the expected discount factor when the process first
. If the profit flow is decreasing at π, the expected discount factor when the process first passes π * from above
Proof. See Appendix A. to reach π * from below. Theorem 2 shows that
is the random first passage time for a process that starts increasing at π and has to come back to π. The above theorem shows that E ¡ e −rT 2 ¢ = δ 1 . Finally, the following result deals with the expected stream of discounted profits while transitioning from one state to another. until the process first reaches π * from below is
. If the profit flow is decreasing at π, the expected stream of discounted profits until the process first reaches π * from above is
(ii)If the profit flow is increasing at π, the expected stream of discounted profits until the process first reaches π from above is ηπ, where η =
. If the profit flow is decreasing at π, the expected stream of discounted profits until the process first crosses π from below is γπ, where γ =
As shown in Figure 3 , E 1 (π, π * ) is the expected area below the path of the process and to the left of T 1 , which, for the case in which r = 0, represents the expected stream of discounted profits while the process grows from π to π * . In turn, ηπ is the expected stream of discounted profits when the process grows from π and first comes back to π In Figure 3 , this is the area to the left of T 2 under the sample path. Lastly, note that
Solution of the General Model
The analysis of entry and exit decisions using the most general version of the model may be algebraically tedious. For this reason, we solve for the optimal entry decision under the assumption that α 1 + α 2 = 0, whereas we solve the monopolist's exit problem by assuming
Thus, one can get the flavor of the richness of the model while keeping algebraic details at the minimum. Yet, the critical steps for solving the entire model can be found in Appendix B.
Entry decision under uncertainty
This subsection considers the firm's decision of entry into a stochastically cyclical market such as the one described in Section 2. If the firm decides to undertake the investment and incur a sunk cost K > 0, then it is assumed to operate indefinitely, i.e., the value of the outside option S equals 0. As mentioned, we also assume the following for expositional purposes.
Given the homogeneity of the process, the firm's optimal investment rule is stationary, that is, the firm will invest at the random time T E at which instantaneous profit reaches a certain level π * E for the first time. Formally, T E = inf {t > 0|Π (t) ≥ π * E }. To solve for such optimal investment threshold, it is necessary to know the firm's expected discounted profit stream if it decides to invest at the instantaneous profit level π. The expected discounted stream of profit is E 1 (π) = ρ 1 π if the market is growing, while it is E 2 (π) = ρ 2 π if the market is declining, where ρ 1 and ρ 2 are constants defined in Theorem 1. We will abuse the notation and still use ρ 1 and ρ 2 despite assuming that
For ease of exposition, we rule out corner solutions if the market is receding and assume that immediate investment is not optimal. Then the following result can be easily shown to hold: 9
Lemma 2 If immediate investment at the initial state is not optimal, then the firm only invests in a growing stage.
When solving for the firm's optimal investment threshold, it suffices to consider the case when the current instantaneous profit level π 0 is increasing by the previous lemma. Once the profit flow reaches such threshold for the first time (i.e., from below), the firm will make the investment immediately. Therefore, the value of the investment opportunity can be written as a function of the current state π 0 :
where f 1 (π|π 0 ) was defined in Section 3 (see Lemma 1) to denote the instantaneous probability of the next switching date occurring at state π given that the current profit level is π 0 .
9 To see why the lemma holds, suppose the firm's optimal entry rule called for investment at a recession phase. Given that any profit level that is reached in the declining stage must have been reached in a growing stage, it is clear that the firm could do better by investing at the same level in the growing stage. The reason is that, in the worst-case scenario, the profit flow would suddenly stop increasing and start decreasing, so the firm must expect to gain more than if it invested immediately in the downturn. This would entail a contradiction.
As shown in Figure 4 , the current instantaneous profit level is π 0 and the firm chooses π E as its investment threshold. Depending on whether the instantaneous profit level reaches π E at the first attempt or not, the firm's value at π 0 consists of two parts. First, whenever the profit level surpasses π E , the firm makes the investment immediately at that state, which generates an expected payoff of E 1 (π E ) − K. Since it takes time t * to reach this level, we have to use the state space discount factor 10 Second, if the instantaneous profit level fails to reach π E and starts decaying at π 0 < π < π E at date t 1 , then the firm must wait at least until the instantaneous profit level first comes back to π. This happens at time t 2 , when the firm's value function must be exactly V 1 E (π). However, it must be discounted back to the original date. The discount factor to use in this case is a multiple of two parts.
The first component,
, is the corresponding discount factor from time t 1 back to the initial time, while the second one is δ 2 (π) = E ¡ e −r(t 2 −t 1 ) ¢ , where t 2 is the random date at which the process first comes back to level π. Thus, it is a discount factor to use for the unknown length of time elapsed since the date at which the instantaneous profit level starts declining until the date at which it first comes back to the same state π. Theorem 2 shows that δ 2 (π) ,the expected discount factor for state π, is a constant denoted by δ 2 .
It takes t
or the instantaneous profit to reach π E from π 0 , given the assumption of exponential growth, so the state space discount rate is e
Figure 4: Optimal Investment Threshold
Using standard optimization techniques, it is easy to show that the following result fully characterizes the solution to (1):
The firm's optimal entry rule is to invest as soon as the profit flow reaches
where
If the market is growing at π 0 , the value of the firm if inactive is
By Proposition 1, the firm chooses to invest when the net present value of its investment exceeds K β 1 −1 > 0, the opportunity cost of exercising the option to invest. Unlike traditional real options models based on Ito processes, the firm's problem can be given the following marginal interpretation: Proposition 2 The optimal investment threshold π * E satisfies
Proof. See Appendix B.
The proposition states that the firm must equal the marginal cost and the marginal value of waiting to invest. The right hand side is the profit flow forgone by delaying entry a small period of time, π * E dt, while the left hand side is the marginal value of waiting, which consists of two components. The first part,
, is the marginal option value of waiting. When the instantaneous profit level reaches π * E , waiting to invest allows the fiirm to avoids making a poor investment in case the process switches to decline immediately, which would occur with an instantaneous probability λ 1 dt, and would only bring an expected stream of discounted profits of E 2 (π * E ) − K, at the expense of sacrificing the option to invest, which would yield an expected payoff of
(accounting for the random-length period of time until the profit flow grows back to π * E ).
The second component, rKdt, is the part of the investment cost saved by waiting an infinitesimal unit of time.
Given Proposition 1, it is straightforward to perform comparative statics analysis on λ i , i = 1, 2:
Corollary 1 π * E is increasing in λ 1 and decreasing in λ 2 .
Increasing λ 1 means the market will stop growing earlier on average. Without the corresponding change in λ 2 , the expected payoff to investment will be smaller. From Equation (3), an increase in λ 1 actually increases the marginal option value of waiting, which in turn induces the firm to delay its investment by choosing a higher entry threshold. On the other hand, an increase in λ 2 implies that it is easier for the market to revert to growth, so the length of the downturn of the market is reduced on average. Thus the firm chooses a lower threshold to enter the market. If λ 1 = λ 2 = λ, then an increase in λ reduces the variance of the profit flow, and the expected time of recurrence is also smaller, as can be seen in Figure   5 , which shows two sample paths with different λ. In some sense, the future is more stable for larger values of λ. If λ = λ 1 = λ 2 goes to infinity, the profit flow level is almost sure to stay always at the same level. The following result simply indicates that if the current instantaneous profit level is smaller than π * E , the firm will never invest. Formally:
Proof. >From Equation (2) , we know that, if λ → ∞, then ρ 1 → 1 r and
To conclude with this subsection, it only remains to show that the value of an investment opportunity experiences an upward (downward) jump when a recession stops (starts).
Specifically, if the firm has not invested, whenever the market switches from growth to decline, the value of an inactive firm switches from V 1 E (π) to V 2 E (π) , where V 2 E (π) denotes the firm's value when the market is declining at π. Proposition 3 below shows, for any state π, the firm's value in the decreasing stage is strictly less than that in the increasing stage.
Although the instantaneous profit level stays at the same state, the firm's value jumps down significantly whenever adverse realizations of uncertainty happen.
Proposition 3 Let π 0 be the current profit flow level. If the firm is inactive,
Proof. If the firm is inactive, then the fact that the firm only invests while the market is
, so the result follows from the fact that δ 2 < 1.
Exit decision under uncertainty
In this subsection, the firm is assumed to be already active in the market. Although it can operate in the market forever, its asset has a one-time opportunity cost of S > 0, and cannot reenter in the future if it exits, i.e., K = ∞. As mentioned in Section 2, we make no specific assumption about the relationship between α 1 and α 2 , and we assume that the drift of the process is exclusively caused by the uneven rate of growth or decay:
By a similar argument to the one presented in Lemma 2, it suffices to solve for the firm's exit threshold in the declining stage, given that, if the firm chooses to exit at π in an increasing stage, then it would have been better off by having exited when the process first crossed π from above. So denote the current state by π 0 and assume that the process is at a decreasing phase. The firm is considering exiting at state π X in order to seize S. Hence, the firm's problem is
As shown in Figure 6 , the firm's value consists of two terms. The first integral is the expected payoff when the firm does exit the market at the first attempt. The integrand consists of two terms.
s the discounted profit stream during the phase in which the profit flow declines from π 0 to π X , 11 while S ³ π X π 0´− r α 2 is the discounted opportunity cost seized by the firm when exiting. On the other hand, the second integral of the value function represents the expected payoff when the firm does not exit the market in the current decreasing phase. It can also be decomposed into two components. The first one is the discounted profit stream when the market declines from π 0 to π and switches to the increasing phase,
+1
¶ . In this case, the firm does not end up exiting the market, and must wait until the profit flow comes back to π for the first time. Theorem ?? shows that the expected discounted profit stream when the market starts increasing at π until it first comes back to π is ηπ, where η is a positive constant. However, when the state comes back to π, the firm gets the expected discounted value of the disinvestment opportunity. For this reason, V 2 X (π) is multiplied by δ 1 , the expected discount factor to use for the length of time elapsed since the profit flow starts increasing until it comes back to state π for the first time from above. Finally, the sum of those two parts has to be multiplied by the discount factor
11 Note that if the profit flow keeps decreasing at the rate of α 2 < 0, then the expected profit stream when the instantaneous profit decreases from π0 to πX is The following proposition summarizes the solution to (4) :
The firm's optimal exit rule is to disinvest as soon as the profit flow reaches
If the market is decreasing at π 0 , the value of the firm if active is
Proposition 5 The optimal disinvestment threshold π * X satisfies
Proof. See Equation (13) in the proof of Proposition 4 in Appendix B.
When deciding whether or not to exit the market, the firm must compare the marginal value and the marginal cost of waiting. By delaying exit, the firm forgoes earning (approximately) rSdt. As usual, the marginal value of waiting to disinvest consists of two components. Delaying exit a little bit allows the firm to reap an instantaneous profit equal to π * X dt. There is also a marginal option value of waiting to disinvest, which of course stems from avoiding making a poor disinvestment decision. With probability λdt, the market would switch to growth, so waiting would allow the firm to remain in operation and keep the option to exit in the future alive, at the expense of sacrificing S.
Corollary 3 π * X is decreasing in α 1 and increasing in α 2 .
The higher the rate of growth (α 1 ) or the lower the rate of decline (|α 2 |) , the more likely the instantaneous profit will keep growing upward. Hence, the firm is more optimistic about the future evolution of the market and thus sets a lower exit threshold.
Finally, we show that the value of a disinvestment opportunity experiences an upward (downward) jump if a recession ends (begins). The following proposition establishes this result, which is different from Proposition 3. Thus, while the jump in the firm's value for a potential entrant is simply due the discount factor related to the delay in entry, the abrupt change of value for an active firm is because of a trade-off between the stream of operating profits reaped and the delayed recovery in the one-time opportunity cost. More specifically, if the profit flow is declining at π 0 > π * X , the firm has a value equal to V 2 X (π 0 ).
However, if the market switches to growth at π 0 , then the firm's value function becomes
, because the firm must choose to wait at least until the profit flow comes back to the same level. The first term, ηπ 0 , denotes the expected stream of discounted profits reaped while the market moves from state π 0 until it first comes back to π 0 from above. The second term, δ 1 V 2 X (π 0 ), denotes the continuation value after the market declines back to π 0 . By comparing V 2 X (π 0 ) and V 1 X (π 0 ), we have the following result:
Proposition 6 Let π 0 be the current profit flow level. If the firm is active, then V 1
Conclusion
This paper has studied irreversible investment in markets that behave according to cycles whose length is uncertain, as opposed to traditional GBM-based real options models. To do so, we have introduced a novel continuous-time framework whose resolution does not require
Ito calculus because it relies on Bayesian updating. Our model is also more amenable to conventional economic analysis than previous frameworks in that it allows for a marginal interpretation of optimal entry and exit rules. In addition, the fact that uncertainty stems from the unknown date of events that critically affect the value of investment opportunities (as in Gutiérrez and Ruiz-Aliseda 2003) implies that empirical predictions also differ from those in the standard real options literature. In particular, we have shown that the value of a firm should discontinuously jump downwards (upwards) when the downturn (upturn) of a cycle begins. For instance, this implies that the stock price of a company should increase (decrease) discontinuously when the financial market realizes that an economic boom (recession) has just started.
The paper has some clear implications for future research, such as for computational industrial organization models of industry evolution in the tradition of Ericson and Pakes (1995), but we would like to point out a couple of directions that seem promising. In the first place, this paper has assumed that the stochastic features of the cycles followed by demand or profit are beyond the control of an individual firm. This might be appropriate for industries that depend on business cycle evolution and whose weight in determining the lenght of such cycles is negligible. However, we believe it is possible to generate the cyclical behavior we have assumed in an endogenous fashion. In particular, we believe that innovation competition in high-tech industries may lead to a pattern of profit evolution such as the one we have considered. Hence, the upturn of a cycle would correspond to a period of market dominance, while the downturn may originate due to an innovation by rival firms and would represent the decrease in profits as the firm loses such dominance. Of course, innovation dates would be random.
In the second place, we believe our paper opens up a completely new horizon for the literature on the econometrics of time series. Despite the sample path of the stochastic process we introduce are potentially complex, our model is very simple and requires knowledge of very few parameters to estimate, which is a clear advantage. It was also assumed that a cycle is simply characterized by an upturn and a downturn so as to provide closed-form solutions. However, it is easy to solve the model with a greater range of growth rates using computational techniques. We believe this is another relevant avenue for future research on stochastically cyclical markets.
Appendix A Proof of Lemma 1
. The time τ elapsed from the current date to the next switching date is exponentially distributed with parameter λ 1 in the increasing stage and λ 2 in the decreasing stage. Let τ 1 be the length of time that it takes for the instantaneous profit to grow from π 0 to π and τ 2 be the length of time that it takes for the instantaneous profit to decline from π 0 0 to π.
The distribution and density functions can be derived by substituting τ 1 and τ 2 into the corresponding exponential distributions.
Proof of Theorem 1 . At each instantaneous profit level π there are two expected streams of profits, depending on whether the profit flow is increasing or decreasing. Let E 1 (π) and E 2 (π) denote the expected stream of discounted profits when the market is growing and declining, respectively.
If the firm is operating at π and the market is growing, then the firm's expected stream of discounted cash flows contains two parts: the expected profit stream during the increasing phase, and the discounted continuation payoff associated to a declining market when the next switching date is realized. Hence, we can define E 1 (π) as follows:
Similarly,
Note that E 2 (πe α 1 τ ) = e α 1 τ E 2 (π) and E 1 (πe α 2 τ ) = e α 2 τ E 1 (π) , so, after some manipulations, Equations (6) and (7) can be rewritten as:
Solving these two equations yields the desired results:
Finally, note that both E 1 (π) and E 2 (π) are positive.
Proof of Theorem 2 .
(i)It suffices to consider δ 2 only. First observe that, for all π, the following must hold: δ 2 (π) = δ 2 . This is because the inter-arrival times between switching dates are independently distributed, so whatever the initial state is, the stochastic process starting at that level must be the same. In addition, it follows that the expected discount factor must be the same. Now let π be the current profit flow level, so that the expected discount factor can be defined as follows
As shown in Figure 7 , the expected discount factor is the multiple of two parts: the first part is the discount factor when the profit level reaches the first switching date, e −rt 1 , while the second part is the expected discount factor when the profit flow level starts at πe α 2 t 1 and first hits the level of π at some random date in the future. The second discount factor
the expected discount factor to use when the process grows from πe α 2 t 1 to π for the first time, which is derived in Part (ii) of this Theorem. Substituting those two parts back into Equation (8) and performing some manipulations yields a quadratic function:
Since δ 2 < 1 by definition, it follows that
because the other root is greater than 1. δ 1 can be derived similarly.
(ii)Let T be the random time that elapses from π until π * is first hit. The expected discount factor when the process starts increasing at π until it first passes level π * > π at some future time T is denoted by ϕ gu (π,
denote the expected discount factor from π to π * > π when the instantaneous profit level is decreasing at π. Given that π < π * , we can choose dt sufficiently small such that hitting the level π * in the next short time interval dt is an unlikely event (i.e. its probability of occurrence is λ 1 dt), so that the same problem restarts at a new level π + dπ. Therefore
Performing a Taylor expansion, canceling terms, dividing by dt and ignoring the terms of order higher than dt yields
Note that if the profit starts going down at π, first it has to come back to π when it is growing before it can hit π * > π at some time. So the discount factor itself must be the multiple of two discount factors, namely ϕ gd (π, π * ) = δ 2 ϕ gu (π, π * ) . Thus it follows that
The general solution of this differential equation has the form ϕ gu (π, π * ) = Aπ
Since ϕ gu (π * , π * ) = 1, we must have A = π * . The expected discount rate for π to π * < π when the market is receding can be derived analogously.
Proof of Theorem ??
. Let π be the current profit level and assume the market is expanding. We are going to calculate the expected stream of discounted profits until the process first hits π * . Let T denote the first passage time from π to π * , and define the transitional payoff from π to π * as
In the following proof, we abuse the notation by writing E 1 (π) instead of E 1 (π, π * ) since π * is fixed. As long as π < π * , we can choose dt small enough such that after dt, the problem starts again at π + dπ. In this case, a Taylor expansion yields:
anceling terms, dividing by dt and letting dt → 0, we have
Note that ζ gd (π) = γ (π)+δ 2 E 1 (π) . The first part is the expected payoff while the process first comes back to π, which is denoted by γ (π) . Observe that γ (π) must be homogeneous in π, since any process starting at any instantaneous profit level π is essentially the same process except for the different starting point. Thus we can let γ (π) = γπ. The second part, δ 2 E 1 (π) , stems from the fact that, when the profit level comes back to π, the same problem starts again, where δ 2 is the discount factor to use for the time elapsed until the process first comes back to π. Therefore, we have
Thus, the general solution can be written as
. Since E 1 (π * , π * ) = 0, we must have
Now we can solve for γ. Note that if π * = ∞, E 1 (π, ∞) = E 1 (π) . Hence B 2 π = ρ 1 π, which gives
Similarly, the expected payoff while the process declines from π to π * < π can be derived:
and the expected discounted stream of profits when the process declines from π until it first comes back to π is ηπ, where
Note that V 1 E (π E ) = (ρ 1 π E − K), so the first order condition can be simplified into − απ E f 1 (π E |π 0 ) 1 − F 1 (π E |π 0 ) (1 − δ 2 ) (ρ 1 π E − K) + rK = (r − α) ρ 1 π E Using Lemma 1, it can be easily shown that απf 1 (π|π 0 ) 1−F 1 (π|π 0 ) = λ 1 ∀π ∈ [π 0 , ∞), which allows us to rewrite the condition as λ 1 (δ 2 − 1) (ρ 1 π E − K) + rK = (r − α) ρ 1 π E
Using the definition of ρ 1 and letting π * E denote the unique solution of Equation ( Now we can derive the value function. Since this is an infinite horizon problem and the firm uses a threshold entry rule, the firm's value function at a different state will be the same except for a different discount factor, given that the firm makes no profit while waiting to invest. Since the firm has not invested at π < π * E , so the following relationship must hold 
Proof of Proposition 2
. Manipulating Equation (11) yields
Hence we have
Substituting the expression of ρ 1 and ρ 2 and routine algebra shows that λ 1 (ρ 1 − ρ 2 ) + (r − α) ρ 1 − 1 = 0.
Finally, note that E 1 (π * E ) − K = ρ 1 π * E − K and E 2 (π * E ) − K = ρ 2 π * E − K, whence the desired result follows.
Proof of Corollary 1
. The results follow from the following four inequalities which can be derived by performing the proper algebra:
Lemma 1 implies that
= −λ 2 = −λ, so that λ (ηπ * X + δ 1 S − S) + π * X = rS
Hence, we have
From Theorem 3, we know η = Now we can derive the value function. Suppose π 0 > π X , since the other case is obvious.
We know that
Substituting (16) into Equation (15) and after some routine algebraic manipulations and simplifications, we have
